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The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), an international expert organisation legally based in Switzerland as a non-profit 
foundation, works for the elimination of mines, explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards, such as unsafe munitions stockpiles. The GICHD 
provides advice and capacity development support, undertakes applied research, disseminates knowledge and best practices and develops standards. 
In cooperation with its partners, the GICHD's work enables national and local authorities in affected countries to effectively and efficiently plan, 
coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate safe mine action programmes, as well as to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
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Albania’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination problem is a result 
of the 1999 Kosovo conflict. Armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
laid landmines along both sides of Albania’s border with Kosovo, in the north-eastern 
Kukës region.  
 
The Albanian Mine Action Committee and the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) 
were established by the government in 1999. In 2002, the UNDP initiated a capacity 
building project to build mine action coordination and monitoring capacity.  
 
By the end of 2007, AMAE was fully nationalised and, in November 2009, Albania 
declared the completion of its mine clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention, several months ahead of schedule.  
 
Albania is one of the few countries with a contamination problem that: 
• established national structures to address the problem,  
• harnessed international support to build its national capacity,  
• developed and implemented realistic plans ahead of schedule with a team of 
national staff 
 
Albania also made significant strides in putting in-place sustainable systems and 
structures for physical and medical rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors and for 
people with disabilities. 
 
One of the main objectives of UNDP’s main goals in supporting Albania was the 
promotion of national ownership and the integration of the AMAE within government 
structures. This was not achieved however, and administratively, AMAE remained a 
UNDP Direct Execution project implementation unit for its duration.  
 
In November 2009, Albania was declared free of mines and ERW. Following completion, 
AMAE phased-out most of its operations but did not formally close due to efforts to 
assess whether AMAE´s capacity could be used to support the clearance of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) hotspot areas and the Government´s ammunition disposal programme.  
 
In addition to its mine/ERW contamination problem, Albania has a problem with excess 
and unstable ammunition in military depots left from the former communist regime. 
Over the years, ammunition depot explosions have resulted in deaths, injuries and 
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Demining (GICHD) and the UN Mine Action Team on transitioning UN-managed and supported mine action 





displacement. In response to an accident that took place in Gërdec in 2008, the 
Government endorsed the demilitarisation2 of all hazardous ordnance by 2013. In 2010, 
UNDP´s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery undertook an assessment that 
provided guidance on AMAE transition options. The following year, the Government of 
Albania and the UNDP formally agreed to use AMAE (renamed the Albania Mine and 
Munitions Coordination Office – AMMCO) to monitor and coordinate the clearance of 
19 hotspot areas across the country.  
 
It took approximately one year for the Ministry of Defence and the UNDP to formally 
approve AMMCO’s mandate, and the question of national ownership and integration 
within the government persists. Continuing as a UNDP project implementation unit is 
not sustainable and AMMCO´s future is at risk as long as it depends on the support of 
the UNDP to sustain it. 
 
Completion of the AMAE’s transition to AMMCO was also slow and beset by delays. 
Earlier guidance from the UNDP on programme closure, and the use of mine action 
capacity to support wider security-related programmes, could have better facilitated 
these transitions. Based on AMAE´s experiences, AMMCO needs to develop a clear 
strategy to address integration within the government, sustainability and closure. 
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 Demilitarisation refers to “…the complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition, mines and 
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The Republic of Albania is located in the Balkans region, and shares borders with 
Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece. Albania’s population is estimated at 3.15 
million, and the country is ranked 70 out of 187 countries on the United Nations (UN) 
Human Development Index (HDI), just below the regional HDI average for Europe and 
Central Asia. High GDP growth rates in recent years have meant a reduction in poverty.3 
However, significant regional and urban/rural disparities exist.  
EXCESS AMMUNITION 
Stores of ammunition in former military depots, left over from Albania’s former 
communist regime, pose a serious safety threat. In 1992, there were over 194,000 





Numerous depots exploded during the civil unrest in March 1997, and several minor 
explosions have taken place since. The largest and most serious explosion took place in 
Gërdec in March 2008, killing 27 people, injuring over 300, and resulting in the 
evacuation of over 4,000 residents.5  Following this (which coincided with Albania’s 
entry into NATO), the government prioritised ammunition disposal, and launched a 
national action plan on excess ammunition. 
 
Today, according to the Albania Mines and Munitions Coordination Office, there are 19 
UXO hotspot areas in the country. These are defined as ammunition depots or 
abandoned army camps where ammunition explosions have resulted in the areas being 
contaminated with UXO. The Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) has conducted surface 
clearance in some of these areas, but not according to international humanitarian 
standards, and UXO-related accidents have since occurred. According to estimates from 
the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE), there have been at least 699 abandoned 
explosive ordnance (AXO) casualties, killing 109 people and injuring 590.  
 
Approximately 90 per cent of Albania’s surplus ammunition is reportedly over 40 years 
old. Consequently, much of the ammunition has lost its physical and chemical 
properties, increasing the likelihood of unplanned explosions. 6 Albania’s Ministry of 
Defence classifies at least half of all its ammunition depots to be at high risk of 
detonation, due to overstocking and the relocation of old stocks, posing a serious threat 
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 According to ALB-AID, this number was reduced to 63,000 tonnes, as of January 2011. 
5
 Dangerous Depots: The Growing Humanitarian Problem Posed by Aging and Poorly Maintained Munitions Storage 
Sites, Fact Sheet, Summer 2010, US Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. 
6
 South-east European Surplus Arms: State Policies and Practices”, Issue Brief, No.1, November 2010, Small Arms 




to public health and safety.7 Stockpile management and ammunition disposal therefore 
remain challenges.  
 
In addition to the excess ammunition problem, the Ministry of Defence has estimated 
that, during the civil unrest in 1997, approximately 652,000 weapons of different 
calibres, 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition, 3.5 million hand grenades, 3,600 tonnes of 
explosive devices and one million mines were looted from military depots. Unofficial 
estimates are higher.8 The government has taken action to collect munitions and small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) looted from the ammunition depots, and to reduce 
surplus aging munitions.9  
MINE/ERW CONTAMINATION 
Albania’s landmine and UXO problem stems from the 1999 Kosovo conflict, when the 
armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) laid mines along both sides of 
Albania’s border with Kosovo, in its northeastern Kukës region. Cluster munitions strikes 
carried out by the FRY Armed Forces and NATO between April and June 1999 also 
contributed to the UXO problem.  
 
Non-technical surveys carried out after the conflict identified approximately 15 km2 of 
suspected hazardous areas along the Albanian/Kosovo border in the districts of Kukës, 
Has and Tropoje.10 A total of 39 villages and approximately 25,000 people were 
affected. Over 80 per cent of mine and ERW-related injuries occurred while people were 
engaged in livelihood activities, (eg agriculture, herding animals, collecting water).
11
 
Mine/ERW contamination impeded the region’s socio-economic development and 
exacerbated its social and economic exclusion from the rest of the country. 
 
On 29 February 2000, Albania ratified the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) and on 30 November 2009, the Government of Albania fulfilled its obligations 
under Article 5 of the APMBC to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in known mined areas, nine months ahead of schedule. Since 2000, through 
survey and clearance, Albania has released approximately 16 km2 of land and destroyed: 
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 Electronic Mine Information Network, Albania, Summary, http://www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=195, accessed 
July 25, 2011; Paul Holtom, Henry Smith, Bernardo Mariani, Simon Rynn, Larry Attree, Juliana Sokolová. 'Turning the 
Page: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania', Report on Small arms and security in South Eastern Europe, Center 
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Arms and Light Weapons in Albania', Report on Small arms and security in South Eastern Europe, Center for Peace 
and Disarmament Education and Saferworld, 2005. 
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 The process of destroying the surplus ammunition was an obligation for Albania to join NATO. Due to its efforts in 
this regard, Albanian became a NATO member in April 2009 
10
 Albania National Mine Action Plan for Completion Fulfilling the obligations under Article 5 of the Antipersonnel 
Mine Ban Treaty 2007-2010, December 2006. 
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• 12,452 antipersonnel mines 
• 152 anti-vehicle mines 
• 4,965 items of UXO 
 
Between 1999 and 2009, national and international support for mine action was 
estimated at USD 31.7 million, including in-kind contributions from the government, in 
the form of explosives and emergency medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) services.12 
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OVERVIEW OF THE ALBANIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ALBANIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
In 1999, the Ministry of Defence first established Albania’s national mine action 




 functions as Albania’s national mine action authority, overseeing policy-making, 
supervising the mine action programme and determining the overall direction of mine 
action. Until completion in November 2009, AMAC met regularly, oversaw the national 
mine action programme, and facilitated inter-ministerial coordination.
14
  
THE ALBANIAN MINE ACTION EXECUTIVE (AMAE) 
The Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) was established to implement, coordinate, 
and monitor the national mine action programme, and to serve as the national mine 
action centre. However, in March 2002, due to financial difficulties and a lack of 
expertise, the Albanian Government agreed that UNDP Albania would provide direct 
financial and technical assistance to AMAE, and that AMAC would play an advisory role. 
AMAE was then administered as a project unit through the UNDP direct execution (DEX) 
capacity building project.  
 
AMAE’s main functions included:  
 
• the development of national mine action standards;  
• identifying, surveying, and marking areas contaminated by landmines and UXO 
through its mine/ERW operating partners;  
• tasking mine action activities;  
• collecting, collating, maintaining, and disseminating data on mines and UXO;  
• investigating all mine-related incidents and ensuring that appropriate follow-up 
activities occurred;  
• serving as a liaison and coordination body with national and international 
bodies; and accreditation and Quality Management.15 
THE ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES 
In 1999, the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF), in association with CARE International, 
conducted the first general survey of mine/ERW contaminated areas.  
                                                    
13
 Chaired by the Deputy Minister of Defence, AMAC includes members from the Ministries of Labour and Social 
Affairs, Health, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Education and Economy. UNDP, UNICEF, ITF, donors and the Albanian Red 
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Prevention and Recovery, September 2010. 
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Since 2004, the AAF has contributed MEDEVAC support and explosive materials to the 
national mine action programme to destroy mines and UXO.  It has also been involved in 
the destruction of anti-personnel landmine stockpiles through NATO’s Maintenance and 
Supply Agency (NAMSA), and in clearing hotspot areas, though not in accordance with 
international standards, and UXO-related accidents have since occurred.  
OTHER NATIONAL ACTORS 
The Kukës hospital plays an important role in providing medical assistance to mine/ERW 
survivors and persons with disabilities.  
 
With support from AMAE/AMMCO and the international community, the hospital has 
been operating a prosthetics workshop, and providing physiotherapy services that are 
unavailable in most parts of the country.  
 
Also in Kukës, the Albanian non-governmental organisation ALB-AID (formerly the 
Victims of Mines and Weapons Association) provides risk education and assistance to 
victims of mine/ERW accidents and their families, and works on disability and risk 
education issues at a national level.  
 
The Albanian Red Cross is also involved in risk education and data collection 
countrywide. With support from UNICEF, the Institute of Curricula and Studies (part of 
the Ministry of Education) developed materials for teachers and students on risks, 
which include information on mines/ERW and small arms and light weapons. These 
were piloted in the Kukës region. 
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
The main international actors that have been involved in the Albanian mine action 
programme include: 
 
• Survey and clearance:   
o Danish Church Aid (DCA) - since 2004, DCA has been the sole NGO mine/ERW 
operator in Albania (see Section 2 for more information on DCA) 
o Swiss Demining Foundation (FSD)  
o Handicap International (HI)16  
o RONCO 
o HELP  
 
• Victim assistance (VA): 
o Slovenian Institute for Rehabilitation 
o UNDP 
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 Handicap International planned to undertake clearance however following a training accident in 2004, they were 




o ITF Slovenia 
o HI 
o ICRC/Special Fund for Disabled 
o UNICEF 
 
• Mine Risk Education (MRE):  
o ICRC 
o ITF  
o UNICEF 
 
• Stockpile destruction:  
o NATO 
o NAMSA 
EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME17 
START UP (1999 – 2001) 
Immediately after the Kosovo conflict, the AAF conducted rapid surface clearance in 
Kukës to reduce civilian casualties. The work, however, was not carried out in 
accordance with IMAS, and the area had to be re-cleared.  The AAF also carried out a 
non-technical survey, which was further confirmed by CARE-funded independent 
surveys.18  
 
The government formed AMAC and AMAE in 1999, and international mine/ERW 
operators started conducting clearance operations in 2000, starting with RONCO and 
followed by HELP, DCA and FSD. 
 
In September 2001, a UNDP assessment found that AMAE lacked capacity in key areas 
and that AMAC was barely functioning. The assessment found that the survey and 
clearance operations undertaken during this period were largely unrecorded and 
uncoordinated, with disappointing clearance rates, variable quality, and duplication. 
 
Recommendations were as follows: 
 
• for capacity development for AMAE and AMAC, particularly in regard to AMAE’s 




• a full technical survey, 
• administrative support for AMAE, 
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 See Annex 1 for a timeline of key events. 
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 Republic of Albania. Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Albania, 30 
November 2009. 
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• information management support. 
STEADY PROGRESS (2002 – 2005) 
In April 2002, following a request from the Government of Albania, the UNDP initiated a 
capacity building project to build mine action coordination and monitoring capacity. 
With EC funding, a 21-month technical survey was carried out to obtain a more accurate 
assessment of the location of minefields and battle areas in the contaminated districts 
of Has, Tropoje and Kukës.  
The project had two main objectives:  
 
1) to conduct technical survey and clearance of mined and battle areas in Kukës; 
and  
2) to provide technical and managerial training to national staff for the future 
establishment of a national demining organisation.  
 
Initially, Handicap International (HI) got the contract for technical survey. However, in 
May 2004, during a HI training lecture, there was a serious accident with newly 
recruited deminers, resulting in two deaths and several injuries. HI suspended its 
activities and eventually left Albania.  
 
DCA then won the technical survey and clearance contract and the project began in 
2005. Capacity development of national staff was an important aspect of the project, 
with DCA aiming to hand responsibility for the planning, management, execution and 
supervision of the demining teams over to national staff eventually. As lack of funding 
had also forced FSD to leave the country, DCA became the sole mine/ERW operator 
working in Albania from 2004. 
 
IMSMA was set up in 2000. In 2003, an IT advisor was recruited, database training was 
provided to all staff, and the use of IMSMA became a priority. An AMAE regional office 
was established in Kukës, including an integrated quality management section for 
quality control and quality assurance of all mine action operations.20 Albania developed 




Albania’s first national mine action plan was developed for 2003-2005. It called for the 
phasing-in of government responsibility by 2004-2005, when it was expected that only 
low priority areas would remain.22  
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COMPLETION IN SIGHT (2006 – 2009) 
During this period, AMAE focused on completing the clearance of all known mined 
areas, as outlined in Article 5 of the APMBC.  
 
UNDP support for completion, through the Completion Initiative, was vital, particularly 
in helping mobilise donor support. To strengthen national capacity, UNDP also 
continued to provide AMAE with advisors in technical and victim assistance, as well as in 
quality management. The victim assistance advisory position was terminated in 2006, 
and the chief technical advisor/project manager position the following year. From 2008 
onwards, UNDP support for AMAE was primarily financial, mainly covering salaries and 
running costs, and by this point, all of AMAE’s managers and staff were nationals. 
 
In 2007, there was less than 2 km
2
 of land requiring clearance remaining. A UNDP-
commissioned evaluation23 considered it too late at this stage to spend time and energy 
trying to integrate AMAE into the Ministry of Defence. Given that completion was in 
sight and there was no clear plan in place to use mine action capacity for other purposes 
after completion, the evaluation recommended that AMAE instead focus its efforts on 
completing its clearance obligations and closing down. No further efforts were taken to 
integrate AMAE in government. 
 
The March 2008 Gërdec ammunition depot explosions were a turning point for AMAE, 
who were asked by AMAC to contribute to the overall response to the explosions during 
the emergency phase. The AAF’s response indicated constraints in coordination and 
emergency explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). AMAE assisted by mobilising two DCA 
teams, with emergency clearance support from the German Government, and worked 
with ALB-AID and the ARC to deliver emergency risk education in affected communities.  
 
Despite the fact that completion was clearly in sight, and that there was a clear need to 
use mine action capacity to support the clearance of UXO contamination in hotspot 
areas, no decision was taken by the Government of Albania at this point in time on the 
future role of AMAE. 
 
In December 2008, AMAC, in cooperation with UNDP, presented a revised national mine 
action plan for completion in 2009–2010. The plan specified that AMAE would continue 
to coordinate and monitor mine action activities until March 2010, when it would shift 
to the EOD Response Section in the Ministry of Defence. In November 2009, the 
Government of Albania met its article 5 obligations, several months ahead of schedule – 
a significant achievement for the government, AMAE and its international supporters.  
 
Box 1. Findings from evaluations 
The 2007 UNDP evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme concluded that the 
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programme was comprehensive, well coordinated and well received by all key 
stakeholders. Donors interviewed by the 
Evaluation Team unanimously expressed that their funds were used efficiently and 
effectively. This was viewed as a worthy achievement, considering the complexity of 
managing a mine action programme, and the remoteness and poor infrastructure of 
the Kukës region, where the landmines are located. At that time, the programme had 
made steady progress, having cleared 87 per cent of the mined area, provided 
assistance to those injured by the mines, and educated the people in Kukës about the 
risks involved with landmines and other remnants of war. 
 
In 2010, an internal assessment conducted by UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery (BCPR) concluded that AMAE had directly contributed to the success of the 
Government of Albania´s priorities and international commitments in relation to 
landmines and ERW, including cluster munitions. Key indicators of AMAE´s success 
included: 
 
• “All known hazardous areas cleared before APMBT and CCM treaty deadlines.  
• A systematic and effective risk education programme reducing the number of mine 
or cluster munitions casualties to zero since 2005.  
• A consistent and effective focus on accident survivors and their long term 
rehabilitation.  
• An established and effective relationship with the ministries of Labour and Social 
Affairs, and Health.  
• Effective coordination structures promoting collaboration between implementing 
agents, government, donors and international actors.  
• Established effective working relationships with local authorities and communities.  
• Effective integrated approach undertaken combining clearance with community 
liaison, risk education and technical survey activities.  
• Consistent and adequate funding has been achieved for the programme, and 
donors having indicated their high degree of confidence in AMAC and AMAE.  
• Sound accreditation procedures, ensuring only competent organisations undertake 
mine clearance work.  
• Effective quality management procedures and standards providing confidence in 
the quality of mine clearance work.  
• Sound information management system with the potential to be adapted to 
demilitarisation and hotspot clearance.  
• Effective planning mechanisms that enable time-bound targets and milestones to 
be set. 
• The presence of committed, motivated, technically competent and knowledgeable 
staff within AMAE, who work without international technical advisors.  
• A surplus of equipment ready to be deployed on future programmes.  




conjunction with Demilitarisation Committee.”24  
 
BEYOND COMPLETION (2010 TO PRESENT) 
Completion, while a clear success, inevitably prompted renewed questions about the 
future role of AMAE.25 In late 2009, the Albanian Government and the UNDP began to 
discuss the option of using AMAE to address residual ERW contamination and surplus 
ammunition. An internal assessment conducted by the UNDP and carried out by 
specialists from the Bureau for Crisis Response and Recovery (BCPR) in August 2010 
argued that the closure of AMAE would be a loss to Albania’s development and 
disarmament communities, and to Albania’s capacity to address its residual mine/ERW 
threat and support mine/ERW survivors. 
 
The focus of AMAE’s activities in 2010 and 2011 was on victim assistance, in particular 
on: 
 
• emergency assistance and ongoing healthcare 
• physical rehabilitation 
• provision of prostheses 
• social and psychological support 
• socio-economic reintegration  
 
These activities were carried out with national and international partners.  
 
In November 2010, the ministries of Health and Defence, in association with AMAE, 
organised a national victim assistance workshop to assess progress in victim assistance 
and to develop a long term national plan in line with the Cartagena Action Plan.26 AMAE 
also provided support to the Government of Albania, which was the chair of the APMBC 
in 2011, and reported on progress under key disarmament-related conventions. 
 
In March 2011, AMAE was renamed the Albania Mine and Munitions Coordination 
Office (AMMCO). This new name better reflected its new mandate of monitoring and 
coordinating unexploded ordnance hotspot clearance operations, alongside its existing 
mine/ERW reporting obligations under the APMBC, and its victim assistance role.  
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 UNDP Bureau for Crisis Response and Recovery. Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) & 
Transition Plan, Final Report, September 2010. 
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 Republic of Albania. Article 7 Report for the year 2010. To the Secretary General of the United Nations 
On the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 






During the second half of 2011, AMMCO focused its efforts on securing approval from 
the Ministry of Defence and UNDP to expand its mandate. On 1 November 2011, the 
UNDP and Albania’s Minister of Defence signed a Memorandum of Understanding that 
formally approved the mandate of AMMCO.27 Section 3 provides a more in-depth 
examination of the current context and the process that AMMCO initiated to address 
hotspot clearance, ammunition disposal and nation-wide survivor assistance. 
GENDER 
AMAE has always disaggregated data on victims by sex and age and used it for donor 
reports and when developing victim assistance and risk education programmes (eg, to 
better target vocational training and employment opportunities for survivors and their 
families).  Gender equality and participation has also been a consideration when 
planning MRE, and establishing anti-mine committees in affected communities.
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HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
UN SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION 
From the outset, the UNDP’s intent was to gradually shift management responsibilities 
for AMAE to the government.28 
 
The UNDP covered AMAE’s running costs when it was first established in 1999, and, in 
2001, carried out an assessment of mine action capacity and needs. This led, in 2002, to 
a two-year capacity project which sought to: 
 
• provide support to AMAC and AMAE 
• strengthen mine action information management 
• develop a national mine action plan, including policies and guidelines 
• develop integrated plans for MRE and risk reduction 
• support mine clearance.29  
UNDP support for mine action was framed as part of UNDP’s wider programming on 
democratic governance and human security in Albania. In the Kukës region, UNDP 
implemented weapons for development and local governance initiatives, and tried to 
promote synergy among the various projects, including local economic development, 
weapon collection30 and control, mine action, preservation of the environment and 
natural resource management. UNDP’s Small Arms and Light Weapons Control 
Programme and its Support to National Mine Action Programme were also components 
of its efforts to promote socio-economic recovery and development in the region.31 
 
Between 2002 and 2006, UNDP provided technical advisors, equipment and funding for 
AMAE headquarters and its regional office in Kukës. It also provided technical assistance 
for: 
 
• developing the mine action plan, 
• managing the mine action programme, 
• improving the mine action information management system, 
• developing plans for MRE and risk reduction, 
• supervising survey and clearance operations according to international mine 
action standards (IMAS).  
 
In 2002, a UNDP chief technical advisor and an information advisor provided technical 
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support to the AMAE. The following year, an operations advisor from the Swiss General 
Staff was seconded to AMAE, and by the end of 2003, there were four technical 
advisors. The number of international technical advisors peaked in 2005, when the 
UNDP appointed a quality management advisor.  
 
Albania’s mine action programme was nationalised by the end of 2007, with national 
staff carrying out all aspects of the mine action programme. The sole exceptions were 
the expatriate programme manager for national clearance capacity and DCA’s Quality 
Management advisor. 
 
As with all mine action programmes, the quality and effectiveness of technical advisors 
varies widely, and each advisor has their own skills and competencies. This was largely 
the case in Albania. Overall, UNDP support helped to strengthen AMAE’s 
professionalism, capacity and management. UNDP also played a crucial role in 
strengthening and building the capacities of state medical institutions at national and 
local levels. This was achieved through the provision of adequate technical support and 
training, and direct assistance in addressing the socio-economic needs of landmine/UXO 
survivors. UNDP also implemented development projects in Kukës, with particular 
attention to previously mine-affected villages, thus contributing to overall development 
in the area.  
 
UNICEF was also involved in mine action for mine risk education and victim assistance. 
In 2004, UNICEF provided funding to the Ministry of Education’s Institute of Curricula 
and Studies for the development of teaching modules on mine/ERW contamination 
risks, for use in schools nationwide.  
 
The materials were initially piloted in Kukës and, in 2009, the draft curricula were 
revised, to include threats from small arms and light weapons, which was framed as 
part of a wider range of risks. However, as of September 2011, the curriculum remains 
in draft format due to lack of funding for final revision, pilot testing and printing. The 
Institute of Curricula maintains it does not have the funds to finish the job. It would not 
require significant resources to finalise and print the curriculum however, and it has 
been in draft form for several years, indicating that the government does not see the 
project as a priority. 
UNDP Capacity development project 
AMAE developed into a professional and well-run mine action centre. Recognition of 
the professionalism of AMAE´s staff and their capacity to effectively manage the mine 
action programme was widely acknowledged. UNDP support for AMAE was critical in 
this, particularly in regard to funding, which enabled the AMAE Director to manage the 
programme and recruit and retain qualified and committed staff. A critical component 
of this success was due to the commitment and drive of AMAE´s Director. 
 




autonomous capacity in Albania, in order to coordinate and monitor mine action 
activities in accordance with international standards, with funding from several donors. 
The intention was for the mine action programme to be sustainable, self-sufficient, 
incorporated within the government and independently managed, with the following 
outcomes: 
 
1. Strengthening of national capacity within the mine action programme. 
2. Provision of technical support and training to AMAE staff. 
3. Support for and overseeing of mine action activities, and monitoring of compliance 




AMAE staff benefited from professional training arranged through the UNDP and ITF 
with Cranfield and James Madison universities, as well as on-the-job training and 
mentoring provided by UNDP technical advisors. It is clear that AMAE´s capacity 
improved substantially, to such an extent that the programme was nationalised by the 
end of 2007, and since then, UNDP support has been largely financial and 
administrative. 
However, one of the main shortcomings of UNDP´s support was the inability to ensure 
that AMAE was incorporated within government structures, and receiving financial 
contributions from the national budget as originally envisioned. Since completion in 
November 2009, AMMCO remains a UNDP DEX project unit for administrative and 
financing purposes.   
UNDP Completion Initiative 
At the end of 2006, UNDP’s Capacity Building project was due to end. However, there 
were fears that AMAE would not be able to mobilise sufficient donor support to meet 
its clearance obligations on time.  
 
Following discussions with the national mine action authorities, UNDP included Albania 
in its Completion Initiative. The purpose of the UNDP Completion Initiative was to 
accelerate mine action activities in countries where a concerted effort and a relatively 
modest investment of approximately USD 10 million would solve the landmine problem 
in a short timeframe (ie 3-5 years). At the same time, it tried to promote national 
ownership and ensure sustainable capacity was in place for clearance, survey and 
residual contamination problems that may arise beyond treaty deadlines.33  
 
With support from the Completion Initiative, the Government of Albania developed the 
Albania National Mine Action Plan for Completion 2007-2010 in December 2006. The 
Completion Plan outlined two main strategic objectives: 
 
1. Clear all known Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHA) by 2010. 
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2. All landmine/ERW survivors receive medical care and have access to assistance that 
leads to full integration into community life. 
 
A memorandum of understanding signed between the government and UNDP in 2007 
agreed that UNDP would continue to provide administrative and financial support to 
AMAE until the end of 2010.  
 
In effect, the completion plan was Albania’s transition plan. It specified that, following 
the closure of the mine action programme in March 2010, the responsibility for mine 
action would be transferred from UNDP to the EOD Response Section in the Ministry of 
Defence. It also specified that mine action capacities would be integrated into existing 
civil protection/defence structures to address residual mine contamination threats, and 
into the AAF’s EOD response capacity.
34
   
 
There was a small reference to the use of technical mine action capacity for EOD 
response and for possible UXO and ammunition destruction in other areas of the 
country. The plan referred to the transition to the national government and mentioned 
that the government was considering further in-kind support (eg premises for AMAE). 
According to the plan, by the end of 2010, the mine action programme would be closed.  
 
Despite this, it also alluded to a possible shift in AMAE´s mandate and, in doing so, left 
the door open to a future beyond mine action. It specified that mine action capacity 
could be used more widely, in, for example: 
 
• the destruction of ERW, 
• provision of MRE, 
• victim assistance support.  
 
No clear guidance on how this transition should take place was provided, however. 
 
The Completion Initiative was successful in packaging and communicating the Albanian 
programme’s achievements, developing a concrete plan for completion, and mobilising 
sufficient donor resources to achieve the plan’s objectives. 
UNDP Kukës Regional Development Initiative 
The Kukës region, located in the northeast of the country, is one of the poorest, with 
approximately 37 per cent of the populating living below the poverty line.35  
 
In 2005, the UNDP implemented a three year development programme in Kukës.  The 
Kukës Regional Development Initiative (KRDI) built on a previous local governance 
programme and an Area Based Development Framework for the region.  Its purpose 
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was to provide sustainable livelihoods through rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
small community infrastructure. Communities affected by mines/ERW were prioritised, 
demonstrating an alignment between mine action and development priorities and 
programming. 
DANISH CHURCH AID 
In 2002, following the closure of its mine action operations in Kosovo, Danish Church 
Aid (DCA) transferred its equipment and staff to Albania. From 2004 onwards, DCA was 
the sole mine/ERW operator working in Albania with international funding.  
 
DCA played a key role in developing national mine action capacity, to such an extent 
that on completion, apart from one expatriate staff member, all personnel were 
Albanian, including those responsible for operations and the supervision of 
survey/clearance teams. With funding from UNDP, the European Commission and the 
US Department of State, DCA trained and equipped six national demining teams, and 
administration and logistics staff. DCA also oversaw the managerial and financial aspects 
of the teams. 
 
Albania’s 2006 national mine action plan for completion outlined how to deal with 
Albania’s remaining mine threat by 2010. It called for the development of National 
Clearance Capacity (NCC), which consisted of six demining teams, to replace DCA in the 
form of a national non-governmental organisation, when it left Albania. The completion 
plan envisaged that, after 2010, when Albania would meet its Article 5 obligations, the 
NCC would be integrated into the AAF’s explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity. 
 
However, upon further consideration, DCA discontinued plans to establish the NCC. 
Given the small amount of contamination remaining and the bureaucratic challenges 
involved in trying to register the DCA teams as an Albanian NGO, DCA decided the effort 
would detract from plans to achieve completion by 2010. The 2007 UNDP evaluation 
also recommended against establishing NCC, as it would distract Albania from meeting 
its Article 5 obligations on schedule.  
 
Following completion in November 2009, DCA implemented a re-training and re-
integration pilot project for the 80 technical and 30 support staff left without 
employment.36  
 
Throughout 2011 and 2012, DCA was sub-contracted by Sterling International to remain 
in Albania and clear UXO hotspots, based on the tasks issued by AMMCO. Thirty-five 
national staff and one expatriate are employed, as well as two teams of six operators, 
one team leader and two medics. DCA’s teams began identifying and collecting UXO in 
                                                    
36
 DCA hired a consultant to undertake a needs assessment and to assess the job market in Kukës. DCA personnel 
were allowed to select the type of training they wanted. However, on hindsight, DCA indicated that some 
consideration should have been given to strengthening EOD capacity to deal with residual mine, ERW and AXO 




hotspot areas in November 2011. The transport of the items to disposal areas or their 
on-site destruction was supported by the AAF’s EOD teams.37 See Section 3 for more 
information.  
 
One concern about DCA’s involvement in UXO hotspot clearance relates to the EOD 
training of its demining teams, which is not at the required level for hotspot/battle area 
clearance (BAC). DCA has provided some refresher BAC training for the teams, but it will 
need to strengthen their EOD capacity to proceed with hotspot clearance.  
 
In September 2011, DCA submitted a proposal for additional funding to the 
International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), to cover the 
costs of a new international EOD advisor to accompany the clearance teams. New 
funding in 2012 may make this possible. 
DONOR FUNDING 
Donor funding steadily increased - peaking in 2005 - as the scale and nature of the 
contamination problem became clearer, and AMAE´s capacity to monitor and 
coordinate operations improved,.  
 
Albania’s main donors for mine action have been the US Department of State, the 
European Union, UNDP and several others.
38
 A significant amount of this funding was 
channelled through the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims 
Assistance (ITF).  The UNDP´s Completion Initiative, along with ITF support, helped 
Albania mobilise sufficient resources from the international community to meet its 
clearance obligations several months ahead of schedule – a significant achievement. 
 
The ICRC also supported training for mine action staff in the areas of prosthetics and 
EOD, and the ITF played a critical role, particularly in support of the development of 
AMAE´s capacity. The ITF: 
 
• provided training for national staff on quality assurance, quality control and GIS 
systems;  
• provided equipment for AMAE’s office in Tirana;  
• helped fund the establishment of the regional office in Kukës. 
 
These complemented UNDP’s core funding, which provided for staff salaries and 
running costs. 
 
The European Union support was also instrumental in ensuring UNDP support to AMAE, 
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not only in terms of running costs but also in terms of logistical support and mine 

























CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION 
PROGRAMME  
ALBANIA MINE AND MUNITIONS COORDINATION OFFICE (AMMCO): 
MINE ACTION CAPACITY IN SUPPORT OF DEMILITARISATION 
ALBANIA´S DEMILITARISATION PROGRAMME 
In January 2012, approximately 26,000 tonnes of excess stockpiled ammunition awaited 
disposal in Albania.39 Contamination is widespread in the country, due to: 
 
• aging ammunition stockpiles,  
• insecure and improperly managed weapons and ammunition storage depots, 
• a series of ammunition depot explosions, 
• looting of weapons and ammunition by civilians.  
 
Nineteen sites have been identified as UXO hotspot areas requiring subsurface 
clearance. AMMCO’s preliminary assessments of these areas indicate that the extent of 
the contamination and the risk to surrounding communities remains high. Some 
emergency clearance was carried out by AAF in these areas, but not to international 
standards, and UXO-related accidents occurred after clearance. AMMCO estimates that 
hotspot clearance will continue beyond 2013, although all high priority areas should be 
cleared by then. Open burning and open detonation (OBOD) of ammunition40 is 
currently being carried out by the government in factories in Mjekes, Gramsh and 
Polican.  
 
In 2009, the Prime Minister Sali Berisha announced the demilitarisation41 of all 
hazardous ordnance. He endorsed an action plan, known as “The Action Plan for the 
Elimination of the Excess Ammunition in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”.  
The plan outlines a wide programme of activities that focuses on destroying surplus 
ammunition by 2013, and reducing the number of ammunition depots located close to 
civilian communities.42  
 
The plan refers to five methods of surplus disposal:  
• industrial disposal, 
• disposal by burning, 
• open detonation in demolition sites, 
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• shooting, and  
• sale or donation.43  
 
Given limited government capacity and resources, the plan relies heavily on external 
technical assistance and support. At present, the government has only been able to 
mobilise 30 per cent of the funding needed. 
 
Albania is now a NATO member, so it can no longer benefit from demilitarisation 
support through the NATO Partnership for Peace modality. Donors have been reluctant 
to channel support directly to the Albanian military, and donor meetings that took place 
in Brussels in December 2010 and in Tirana in October 2011 were met with a lukewarm 
response.  
 
This is also the reason why the Albanian Government requested that the UNDP make 
use of the country’s already developed mine action capacity, and that other mine action 
partners contribute to the demilitarisation programme. The government expects this to 
help mobilise the much needed resources for the demilitarisation programme.  
AMMCO´S MANDATE 
The UNDP´s BCPR conducted an internal assessment in 2010 to determine whether 
AMAE, as the national mine action coordination body, could use its skills and experience 
to support the Ministry of Defence with the implementation of the Action Plan on 
excess ammunition. The September 2010 assessment report strongly supported this 
transition based on the clear need for monitoring and coordination of the safe disposal 
of ammunition stockpiles and the survey and clearance of hotspot areas.
44
 AMAE was 
renamed AMMCO, reflecting its new role and mandate, and on 1 November 2011, the 
Government of Albania and the UNDP formally agreed to use AMMCO to monitor and 
coordinate the clearance of the 19 hotspot areas across the country. Depending on 
AMMCO´s success, the Government may also use AMMCO to support wider 
ammunition disposal efforts.  
 
AMMCO is responsible for the accreditation, coordination, monitoring and certification 
of the hotspot clearance operators. In January 2012, it was also agreed that AMMCO 
would be responsible for Quality Management for clearance operations in Gërdec. Up 
till this point, surface clearance had been undertaken by AAF and a commercial 
operator known as EOD Solutions, but had not been subject to external quality control. 
 
AMMCO is specifically responsible for: 
 
• Coordinating and monitoring hotspot clearance, risk education and victim 
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• Reviewing existing standards on safety, quality assurance and quality control, 
community liaison, operations, accreditation and risk education for ammunition 
disposal and hotspot clearance and upgrading them to international standards  
• Developing a standard package for eventual accreditation of private contractors 
seeking to operate open burning and open detonation (OBOD) ranges and hotspot 
areas.  
• Conducting a detailed technical assessment of the remaining hotspots.  
• Developing a plan for clearing all hotspot areas based on the assessment. 
• Adopting mechanisms for ensuring quality assurance and quality control of hotspots 
clearance in assigned locations.  
• Developing adequate public awareness and risk education mechanisms for local 
communities in hotspot areas. 
• Expanding Albania’s existing victim assistance programme to include ERW survivors 
for possible assistance schemes. 
• Establishing a national database for mines/abandoned ammunition victims 
throughout Albania.  
• Resource mobilisation and liaison with government, in particular the Ministry of 
Defence. 
AMMCO capacity 
AMMCO, like AMAE, remains a UNDP DEX project implementation unit. There are no 
plans in place to integrate AMMCO within the Ministry of Defence or any other 
government structure or ministry. This is despite the acknowledgment of AMMCO, 
UNDP and others that AMMCO should, in theory, be part of the government.  
 
In reality, if AMMCO were integrated into the Ministry of Defence, given the context in 
Albania, there is a likelihood that AMMCO´s capacity would dissipate, due to: 
 
• the risk of losing experienced staff due to reduced pay and benefits,  
• the command structure within the Ministry of Defence, 
• limited capacity within the Ministry of Defence, 
• competing political demands.  
 
Funding and Staff 
AMMCO´s projected annual budget for 2012 was USD 400,000. The UNDP Country 
Office supported AMMCO salaries and running costs until the end of May 2012, and 
UNDP BCPR has pledged a further USD 95,000 thereafter.  AMMCO has also initiated 
negotiations with the EU for long term funding for both monitoring and hotspot 
clearance operations.  
 
AMMCO presently consists of: 




• three quality management monitors,  
• specialists in mine action, risk education, victim assistance, socio-economic 
reintegration and IMSMA,  
• administrative staff.  
 
A community liaison officer, an operations officer and, possibly, a public information 
officer may also be recruited.  
 
Given its inter-ministerial composition, the Albanian Mine Action Committee will 
continue to oversee hotspot clearance. This will complement the board that oversees 
the government’s demilitarisation programme, which is currently represented only by 
AAF and the Ministry of Defence. 
AMMCO activities to date 
So far, AMMCO has assessed 16 of the 19 hotspot areas, and has drafted a standard 
operating procedure for QA and QC for hotspot clearance. The remaining hotspot 
assessments are underway, and the Quality Management team is conducting QA/QC of 
DCA’s clearance teams, preparing standards and monitoring templates.  
  
In association with the Albanian Armed Forces and the main implementing partners, 
AMMCO has developed a national UXO clearance plan, which is currently awaiting 
approval from the Minister of Defence. AMMCO will also be involved in the certification 
of clearance operations in Gërdec and will conduct technical assessments of the four 
demolition ranges that have been closed. AMMCO has started assessing the first 
demolition range. 
 
In association with the ICRC, AMMCO intends to train EOD operators in the AAF in first 
aid, and has provided the AAF with three ambulances to date. AMMCO also ensures 
that MEDEVAC services are available for DCA and AAF teams in three areas.  
 
The Government of Albania has contributed the following to support UXO hotspot 
clearance: 
 
• Storage of ammunition collected in UXO hotspot areas in designated AAF depots. 
• Transport of ammunition to the approved demolition ranges with AAF vehicles. 
• Disposal of ammunition in the demolition ranges by EOD experts from the AAF 
Logistics Brigade. 
• In-situ destruction of ammunition and components found in the UXO hotspot areas 
that are considered too dangerous to transport. 
• Standby medical evacuation support by helicopter through the AAF45. 
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There is a national prosthetic and orthotic centre in the capital city Tirana. However, it is 
badly managed, and not accessible to persons with disabilities. The centre needs to be 
relocated and its managerial capacities further upgraded.  AMMCO is working closely 
with the wider disability sector in Albania on the ratification of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and intends to: 
• conduct a detailed assessment of the physical, medical and socio-economic 
conditions of victims injured in abandoned ammunitions accidents , and 
• try to replicate the model of the Kukës prosthetic and orthotics workshop in 
other regions of Albania.  
 
AMMCO has conducted socio-economic impact assessments for each of the hotspots, 
including:  
• an assessment of the socio-economic situation of the area surrounding the UXO 
hotspots  
• risk education, community liaison and victim assistance needs, 
• identification of UXO survivors and their medical and socio-economic needs.46  
 
Information management 
There are approximately 90,000 persons with disabilities in Albania, but the government 
lacks full data on this.  
  
The GICHD’s Information Management Section is assisting AMMCO adapt IMSMAng so 
that, in addition to covering mine action, it also covers hotspot clearance and 
ammunition disposal. AMMCO intends to migrate all its information on mine victims 
into IMSMAng and then include the 699 AXO casualties in the database. Discussions are 
also underway to provide the Kukës Regional Council (the first region to digitalise its 
cadastral records) with IMSMAng, in order to facilitate regional development planning, 
eg land ownership, road development and mapping, identification of mineral resources, 
tourist sites and footpaths etc.  
 
One future possibility is to market IMSMAng, with assistance from GICHD, as a tool for 
the wider disability sector, for example, in tracking needs and publishing available 
services for all people with disabilities in the country.  
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP  
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP IN THE MINE ACTION CONTEXT 
National ownership of a mine action programme is generally reflected through the 
following:  
 
• A high level of interest and leadership in fulfilling clearance, risk education and 
victim assistance obligations.  
• An empowered mine action authority that is provided with the necessary human, 
financial and material capacity.  
• Efforts made to obtain a clear understanding of the extent of mine/ERW 
contamination.  
• A clear understanding of the size, location and quality of the Article 5 
implementation challenge, or a commitment to promptly gain understanding. 
• A realistic but ambitious plan to complete the implementation of Article 5 as soon as 
possible.  
• Stable and significant national financial support for the mine action programme.  
• Integration of mine action structures within national and regional government 
structures. 
• Integration of mine action in relevant development strategies, plans and budgets.47  
 
In Albania, progress towards national ownership of the mine action programme has 
been mixed. One of the main objectives of the UNDP Capacity Building project was to 
have the Albanian government assume full responsibility for the management of the 
mine action programme.48 However, the UNDP BCPR assessment noted:  
 
“An important, but largely unfulfilled, promise of the UNDP project was to create a 
sustainable, self‐sufficient national mine action capacity, one that is incorporated within 
the national government and managerially independent of UNDP. While the project has 
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made remarkable achievements in terms of the technical capacity of AMAE, it has done 
relatively little to incorporate these capacities as a national institution. As previously 
noted, there are no laws that establish AMAE as a legal entity in Albania. Even though 
AMAE has attained a high degree of technical competence and autonomy, it relies on 
UNDP for its operational continuity."49 
 
UNDP capacity building support for AMAE continued until September 2007 when the 
chief technical advisor left and, from that point onwards, UNDP support was largely 
financial, with some administrative assistance. However, to date, AMMCO remains a 
UNDP project implementation unit and is not part of a government structure. 
Therefore, the process of transitioning mine action to national ownership did not take 
place, at least if national ownership is narrowly defined as the government taking lead 
responsibility for establishing a national mine action structure or integrating the mine 
action structure in national and regional government structures. 
 
The 2007 evaluation of the Albanian mine action programme dismissed plans for the 
relocation of AMAE within the Ministry of Defence, which was unreceptive to the idea. 
The evaluation team’s assessment50 reflected that at the time: 
 
• The draft bill to incorporate AMAE within the Ministry of Defence was not high on 
the list of legislative priorities.  
• When the mine action programme ended, AMAE lacked a clearly defined mission 
and purpose. 
• Lower Ministry of Defence staff salaries could prompt AMAE employees to seek 
employment elsewhere. 
• A move to the Ministry of Defence could jeopardise international support. 
• Focusing on relocating within the Ministry of Defence could result in a loss of focus 
on finishing the clearance job by the end of 2009 with only 2 km2 left to clear. 
 
The integration of AMAE within government structures may not have been critical when 
the focus was on completion and when a future beyond mine action was not foreseen.  
 
However, now that AMAE expanded its mandate and became AMMCO, its status as a 
UNDP project implementation unit remains an issue. This point was also emphasised in 
BCPR´s assessment report:  
 
“It is essential that a programme to incorporate AMAE as an Albanian institution with an 
official mandate from the Ministry of Defence is undertaken in parallel, to ensure the 
sustainability of the organisation and the legitimacy of AMAE to carry out a government 
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Apart from the issue of the integration of mine action structures in government, the 
government demonstrated political commitment to resolve the mine/ERW 
contamination problem, through: 
 
• Support for AMAE and AMAC. The government relied on the UNDP to manage 
AMAE, which it regarded as the de facto national mine action centre 
• The Chairman of AMAC was active in supporting national advocacy and resource 
mobilisation efforts. 
• Active involvement of senior Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
officials.  
• The development of a clear and realistic plan to achieve its Article 5 APMBC 
clearance obligations. 
• Stable in-kind contributions (provision of explosives and MEDEVAC services and 
contribution to victim assistance capacities). 
• Development of national mine action standards.  
• Integration of mine action in regional development strategies and initiatives. 
• APMBC implementation legislation enacted in 200652.  
 
In relation to other countries in the region however, national ownership of the mine 
action programme is weak. Over the years, it is the UNDP that has kept AMAE/AMMCO 
operating. Initially, having UNDP manage AMAE as a project was convenient for the 
government and the donors, particularly given the political and economic context at the 
time and the relatively small size of the mine action programme. It also enabled AMAE 
to get on with its work and not be hampered by internal Ministry of Defence politics and 
bureaucracy.  
 
From the perspective of the UNDP and the international community, UNDP support 
helped Albania meet its mine clearance obligations, and is now helping Albania address 
the problem of UXO contamination resulting from unplanned ammunition explosions. 
However, continued UNDP support may have delayed or inhibited the Albanian 
Government from demonstrating meaningful ownership.
53
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At what point should the UNDP either place conditions on future assistance or 
discontinue support altogether and encourage the Government of Albania to take full 
responsibility for AMMCO?  
VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND MINE RISK EDUCATION 
Victim Assistance 
According to the Cartagena Action Plan, national ownership in relation to victim 
assistance consists of: 
  
• High level commitment from the government to address the rights and needs of 
people with disabilities. 
• An empowered national coordination mechanism equipped with sufficient capacity. 
• A clear plan and legislation to address the rights and needs of people with 
disabilities. 
• Commitment and capacity to implement the plan and legislation, and provide 
services. 
• A national focal point for disability issues.54   
 
Significant progress with victim assistance was made in Albania. Through AMAE´s 
efforts, the government leveraged the APMBC to provide support to survivors and 
enhance rehabilitation services more widely for all people with disabilities.  
 
Through its Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (PMR) project, AMAE developed a 
sustainable national response to the PMR needs of mine/ERW survivors and people with 
disabilities. Albania´s first ever regional prosthetic workshop and physiotherapy centre 
was established at the Kukës regional hospital in 2006 and, apart from the first year, the 
hospital has been able to cover the salaries and maintenance costs of the facilities, 
which now serve people from Kukës and wider Albania. Although AMMCO continues to 
help the workshop obtain essential materials from outside Albania, the continued 
operation of the workshop and physiotherapy centre and the inclusion of operating 
costs within the hospital budget are clear indications of ownership.  
 
Albania has a national strategy and legislation on disability, although its enforcement 
remains a problem, as does the level of funding for disability programming. With 
support from the UNDP, Albania has drafted a new law on disability to ensure 
compliance with the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD), which 
it signed in December 2009 but has not yet ratified.  
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The Ministries of Health and Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities lack the 
capacity to take on AMAE/AMMCO’s coordination function for victim assistance or for 
providing financial support and mobilising donor support. Given its limited capacity and 
resources for disability issues in general, the government has relied largely on AMAE to 
act as the national focal point for victim assistance, and AMMCO will continue to fulfil 
this role if funding permits.  
 
Risk education  
Albania does not have a committed focal point within the Ministry of Education or other 
relevant government institutions for risk education. AMAE has played this role and, 
while there is an effective rapid response risk education network, now coordinated by 
AMMCO and implemented through ALB-AID and the Albanian Red Cross, this operates 
outside government structures.   
 
A mine risk education (MRE) curriculum, developed by the Ministry of Education’s 
Institute of Curricula and Studies, was introduced in schools in Kukës as a pilot, and 
there were plans to adopt the curriculum in areas where ERW and AXO contamination 
remained. However, despite efforts on the part of AMAE and UNICEF to support the 
development of educational materials on mine/ERW contamination and small arms and 
light weapons, and to have the material integrated within primary and secondary school 
curricula, the materials remain untested and in draft form. Although UNICEF provided 
funding to the Institute of Curricula and Studies in 2004, the Institute maintains it does 






















PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSITION 
In mine action, transition refers to the process through which the UN reduces its 
support as the host country develops greater national programme management 
capabilities.  In some countries, the transition process is marked by specific phases, for 
example:  
 
• the development and implementation of a transition plan,  
• joint management of the programme,  
• the handover and monitoring of the programme. 
 
In Albania, two forms of transition are evident:  
 
1) Completion of mine clearance and phasing down55 of the mine action programme. 
2) Using mine action capacity to support armed violence reduction.
56
 
PHASING DOWN THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
Albania´s Completion Plan, published in December 2006, signalled that completion of 
clearance would be achieved by August 2010 and that the mine action programme 
would either be: 
 
1. Closed down, with mine action capacity transferred to EOD response capacity within 
the Ministry of Defence and restructured as a humanitarian mine action section; or 
else 
2. Mine action capacity would be used to address wider security issues.  
 
By the end of 2007, AMAE´s last UN technical advisor had left and UNDP support 
consisted mainly of funding and administrative services. While AMAE remained a UNDP 
project implementation unit, it was now managed and staffed with a fully nationalised 
team. It remained unclear whether AMAE would have a role following completion. The 
UNDP evaluation in 2007 therefore recommended that AMAE develop a plan to guide 
the closure of the mine action programme. A specific plan to close the programme was 
not developed, in part because AMAE and its partners ITF and DCA were considering 
expanding its mandate after completion. It was difficult for AMAE to push the issue 
further within the government, due largely to its status as a UNDP project unit.  
 
Also, it was not in the interests of AMAE personnel to push the issue. Strategic guidance 
and support from the UNDP at this point in time on programme closure and/or 
transition options would have been useful. However, the UNDP was focused on 
completion of clearance and all issues related to demilitarisation, including excess 
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ammunition and UXO hotspots, were viewed by Albania’s military and the Ministry of 
Defence as their strict domain. 
 
The Gërdec ammunition depot explosions in 2008 illustrated how coordination and 
technical expertise were needed to address the problem of excess ammunition and AXO 
contamination in hotspot areas. Based on this, why didn’t the Albanian Government and 
the UNDP make a concrete decision about widening AMAE´s mandate?  
 
In the absence of a clear decision about its future, AMAE began to phase down its 
operations in 2010 in preparation for closure by: 
 
• Donating some equipment to the AAF and transferring some equipment, including 
vehicles, to DCA for use in hotspot clearance, based on donor’s agreement57. 
• Closing the regional office in Kukës in December 2010. 
• Terminating the employment contracts of non-essential staff . 
• Making plans to hand over the IMSMA database to the archives section in the 
Ministry of Defence. 
 
While AMAE waited for the government’s and the UNDP’s confirmation about its post-
completion mandate, core AMAE personnel were retained and the AMAE office in 
Tirana continued to report on key disarmament-related treaty commitments, to 
coordinate victim assistance and to provide support to the Albanian Government, which 
had assumed the Presidency of the APMBC.  
 
During this period, AMAE´s director spent significant time discussing how mine action 
capacity could contribute to the national demilitarisation programme and the action 
plan on excess ammunition with the Ministry of Defence, the UNDP Country Office, 
donors and other stakeholders. These discussions and a clear decision by the 
government should have been made well in advance of completion. With a clear 
decision on its future and an official mandate, AMAE would have been able to develop a 
clear transition plan with key partners for UXO hotspot clearance and mobilise the 
requisite international support well in advance. 
USING MINE ACTION CAPACITY TO SUPPORT DEMILITARISATION 
Albania´s 2006 Completion Plan stated:  
 
“…In 2005 alone, there were 21 casualties from AXO throughout Albania. Since 2000, 
there have been 94 casualties as a result of AXO and, what is most relevant is that the 
trend is increasing. In this perspective, it can be considered that the capacities and 
methods already developed and currently used in the Kukës Province for the mine 
problem can be used for other areas of the country to deal with the remaining ERW 
threat.”  
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While, on one hand, the plan provided clarity in regard to the remaining area being 
cleared, and gave a clear date for completion, it also clearly signalled that there was 
scope to use mine action capacity to address AXO/ammunition issues in Albania.  
 
Prior to the March 2008 Gërdec ammunition depot explosions, no concrete discussions 
had taken place about using AMAE and/or mine action capacity in Albania to address 
wider security threats.  In 2005, AMAE, with UNDP support, had carried out a 
countrywide data collection project of mine and AXO survivors, and was considering 
continuing and expanding its victim assistance programme after completion.  
 
Although the problem of excess ammunition and the risks associated with unsafe 
storage in military depots were known prior to Gërdec, ammunition disposal and safe 
storage were regarded as strictly military issues. The widespread use and availability of 
small arms and light weapons in Albania was also well known.58 Despite this, no explicit 
efforts were made by the government or the UNDP to link AMAE and mine action more 
generally to wider armed violence reduction initiatives.  
 
The UNDP, and more broadly, the international community could have mobilised efforts 
to make a strong case to the Ministry of Defence for using mine action capacity to 
support these activities, but failed to do so. 
 
Gërdec was a turning point, and AMAE´s involvement in the response to the accident 
planted the seed for further discussions between AMAE, the UNDP, and eventually the 
Ministry of Defence – particularly given that there were further ammunition depot-
related accidents following Gërdec. The involvement of AMAE, DCA, ALB-AID and ARC in 
the emergency response raised awareness within the government and among donors of 
the lack of coordination and EOD capacity within the AAF.  
 
However, AMAE needed the support of Government, in particular the Ministry of 
Defence, to approve its expanded mandate, as well as confirmation of financial support 
from UNDP. AMAE lacked the political clout to advance these discussions on its own. 
While the UNDP was well positioned to push the government to clarify the future of 
AMAE, the focus of UNDP support in 2008 and 2009 was on assisting the government to 
complete its mine clearance obligations. The UNDP refrained from pushing the 
government to ensure that progress, on completion, was not jeopardised.  
 
Furthermore, based on the findings of the 2007 evaluation, the government and the 
UNDP agreed to continue with the existing modalities. However, while the UNDP 
focused on supporting completion, it could have also, in parallel, pushed for clarity and 
a decision from the government on the future role of AMAE which would not have 
jeopardised progress on completion.  
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Eventually UNDP BCPR responded to requests for support from AMAE and sent a team 
in mid-2010 to conduct an internal assessment of AMAE’s capacity to support 
ammunition disposal and hotspot clearance. The assessment team strongly supported a 
wider mandate for AMAE and provided AMAE with strategic options for achieving this 
transition. However, this advice came almost one full year after completion.59  
 
Following the BCPR assessment mission, AMAE prepared a concept note outlining the 
rationale for using mine action capacity to support hotspot clearance and ammunition 
disposal.60 This was developed by AMAE and the UNDP Country Office, and was shared 
with the Ministry of Defence through the Chairman of AMAC and with the main mine 
action partners.  It provided background on:  
 
the main achievements of the mine action programme;  
 
• AMAE´s potential future role with regards to hotspot clearance and ammunition 
disposal  
• mine/ERW victim assistance  
• risk education and community liaison 
• institutional support  
• AMAE´s main strengths  
 
In early 2011, following the concept note, AMAE developed a brief implementation plan 
on the AMAE transition to hotspot clearance and ammunition disposal.61 
 
The transition implementation plan recognises that AMAE´s mine action capacities;  
 
“…along with the available equipment and infrastructure established during the course 
of the mine action programme are assets that can contribute further to demilitarisation 
efforts including the hotspots clearance contaminated by Explosive Remnants of War 
(ERW) and Abandoned Unexploded Ordnance (AXO).”
62  
 
The plan outlines the scope for AMAE´s engagement, along with milestones/next steps 
to be undertaken by the UNDP to expand AMAE´s mandate. Specific milestones 
mentioned in the plan included AMAE integration with the Demilitarisation Programme 
and Development of Ammunition Demolition capacity in AMAE. The transition 
implementation plan also includes revised Terms of Reference for core AMAE staff. 
                                                    
59
 BCPR did not have the funds to support AMAE beyond March 2010. However, the UNDP Country Office was able to 
use leftover EU funds to keep AMAE operating until the end of 2010 (normal funding came to end in March 2010) 
and, in 2011, was able to support AMMCO with funds obtained through the One UN Fund.  
60
 AMAE. Concept Note: Albanian Mine Action Programme Transition, 2010. 
61
 AMAE, Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the hotspot clearance and ammunition destruction 
programme, 2011. See Annex 7 for a copy of the transition implementation plan. 
62
 AMAE, Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance and Ammunition Destruction 




However, the transition plan does not outline specific objectives, anticipated outputs 
and outcomes, or address the issues of AMMCO integration in government, phasing 
down of AMMCO operations or eventual closure.63  
 
On 1 November 2011, almost two years after completion, the Ministry of Defence and 
the UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding that officially approved AMMCO´s 
new mandate (see Annex 5). The memorandum of understanding also confirmed in-kind 
contributions for hotspot clearance from the government in the form of explosives and 
MEDEVAC services for the clearance organisation’s teams. Completion of this transition 
has been slow and has met with delays as a result of difficulties getting Ministry of 
Defence approval, despite an official request from the Ministry of Defence to UNDP and 
its partners to use Albania’s mine action capacity to support the demilitarisation 
programme. The delay in getting Ministry of Defence approval partly reflected initial 
resistance to AMMCO’s involvement in ammunition disposal.  
 
The Completion Initiative was successful in helping Albania access the resources needed 
to finish the job, but UNDP support at that time did not fully consider the wider role of 
AMAE. Even though completion was in sight by the end of 2006, little had been done by 
the UNDP to plan for the closure of AMAE or the expansion of its mandate. These 
discussions should have been anticipated and planned for well in advance as part of a 
well-conceived transition plan. Instead, little consideration was given on the potential to 
use mine action capacity to address a wider range of threats. Although the need for this 
form of assessment was highlighted in the 2007 UNDP evaluation, nothing took place 
until 2010, when the BCPR assessment took place and a transition plan was 
developed.64 The UNDP came through with funding for a reduced level of 
AMAE/AMMCO operating costs in 2011 and 2012, based on requests from the Ministry 
of Defence to use mine action capacity to support the demilitarisation programme. 
 
A more detailed plan to guide the closure of the mine action programme and its 
transition to AMMCO developed in association with key stakeholders (UNDP, Ministry of 
Defence, donors), could have helped clarify the different options regarding AMAE’s 
future (eg closure vs AMMCO) at an earlier juncture, and the steps required to realise 
the transition. It could have also put pressure on the government and the UNDP to 
formally support the transition without jeopardising progress on completion.  
 
Based on AMAE´s experiences, AMMCO should develop a detailed plan which addresses 
the issues of integration in government, phasing down operations and eventual closure. 
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KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 
• INDIVIDUALS MATTER: AMAE was fortunate to have a director who worked, 
with UNDP support, to recruit and retain a professional and committed team, draw 
upon the experience of international technical advisors and mobilise donor support. 
This resulted in a successful and well-respected mine action programme. His vision 
and drive, and the commitment and professionalism of his team, played key roles in 
AMAE´s transition to AMMCO. 
 
• NATIONAL OWNERSHIP: National ownership in mine action is a complex 
issue. What degree of national ownership is required? Should the mine action 
programme be integrated in government structures and run by a government body, 
even in countries with relatively small contamination problems?  
 
In the context of Albania, it could be argued that the government had sufficient 
ownership to meet its Article 5 obligations. Having the UNDP manage AMAE was 
useful, as it helped safeguard mine action resources and capacity. In a context 
where weak governance and limited capacity are realities, the potential negative 
consequences of having AMAE based within the Ministry of Defence seemed to 
outweigh the positive, ie: 
 
• AMAE would have been viewed as a government programme instead of a 
UNDP initiative.  
• It may have prompted the government to increase its financial commitment 
to mine action. 
•  However, AMAE would have to operate under the MoD chain of command 
and be subject to greater turnover of staff, weak management and lack of 
capacity within the MoD. The risk of a diversion of resources for other 
Ministry of Defence priorities would have increased. 
• It is likely that AMAE´s staff would have either left or risked being replaced. 
 
• NATIONAL OWNERSHIP CAN TAKE MANY FORMS: Ownership should 
not be defined simply as integration in government structures, although this is an 
important component. Albania is one of the few countries that had a contamination 
problem, established national structures to address the problem, harnessed 
international support to build its national capacity, developed realistic plans, and got 
the job done ahead of time and with a fully national team. Albania also made 
significant strides in putting in place sustainable systems and structures for physical 
and medical rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors and, more generally, for people 
with disabilities. AMAE remained a UNDP project implementation unit but it 
received sufficient government support and commitment to enable it to achieve all 





• INTEGRATION IN GOVERNMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY: With the 
closure of the mine action programme and the transition of AMAE to AMMCO, the 
questions of national ownership and integration into the government remain.  
AMMCO’s future is at risk as long as it depends on the support of the UNDP and its 
partners for funding.  A more sustainable solution is required; one that requires 
AMMCO to transition itself into government, be it as an independent government 
entity or as a unit within a department, despite the risks this may entail. Ultimately, 
if the government values AMMCO´s expertise, it will take the necessary means to 
secure its sustainability and effectiveness. AMMCO needs to develop a clear strategy 
that clarifies integration options, phasing down of operations and eventual closure. 
 
• PLANNING FOR CLOSURE: At a certain point, it is important to start thinking 
about completion and closing down the programme. Phasing down operations 
should be based on a clear plan. For example, consider: 
 
o What will happen to the equipment and vehicles, taking into consideration 
the different donor regulations? What should be considered when closing 
regional offices, when terminating staff employment contracts, organising 
re-training and benefits? Who will take over the mine action database? 
o In regard to re-training and the re-integration needs of deminers,65 if there is 
a need to use mine action capacity to support armed violence reduction 
initiatives, then consider offering deminers the opportunity of technical 
training to contribute to these wider strategic programmes (eg, EOD). 
o Are there actors beyond mine action, who could use and benefit from 
IMSMA? For example, consider sharing IMSMA with local and regional 
authorities to support development planning. 
 
• PLANNING FOR TRANSITION: In the Albanian context, two main transitions 
took place – the closure of the mine action programme and the transition of AMAE 
to AMMCO, and the use of mine action capacity to support wider security issues. 
Neither took place according to well-developed transition plans, and both took place 
in a context of uncertainty about AMAE´s future.  A clear transition plan, developed 
in consultation with key stakeholders can:  
 
o help provide clarity regarding various scenarios and the steps required to 
realise each  
o mobilise government and donor support  
o provide staff with greater clarity on their futures  
 
• UNDP SUPPORT FOR COMPLETION AND TRANSITION: With support 
from the UNDP Completion Initiative, the capacity of AMAE was strengthened to the 
extent that by the end of 2007, the programme was nationalised, donor support 
remained, and completion of Albania´s Article 5 APMBC clearance obligations was 
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met ahead of schedule – significant achievements. The Completion Initiative 
highlighted the need for a programme evaluation which, in 2007, recommended the 
need for a detailed plan to phase out the mine action programme. The Completion 
Initiative should have also included clearer guidance on programme exit and closure, 
or use of mine action capacity to support AVR programming. The UNDP BCPR 
internal assessment undertaken in 2010 provided useful strategic guidance to AMAE 
and the UNDP. However, it should have been conducted well in advance of 
completion to provide sufficient time for assessing the context, investigating 
different options and reflecting these in transition planning. 
 
• USING MINE ACTION CAPACITY TO SUPPORT ARMED VIOLENCE 
REDUCTION: In some countries, mine action capacity can and should support 
wider programmes that focus on armed violence reduction (AVR) (peace building; 
small arms collection and destruction; ammunition disposal; disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration; physical security and stockpile management; 
community safety, etc). In Albania, there was a clear need for the capacity and 
expertise that had developed through the national mine action programme, and it 
was logical to make use of it, particularly after the closure of the mine action 
programme. Using mine action capacity to support AVR requires forward thinking, 
vision, and outreach. Conducting an assessment of the wider context can help 
identify opportunities and entry points. 
 




1. It is crucial for all stakeholders, national authorities and mine action centres, operators and donors to 
have a commonly defined vision and goal. Furthermore, results are to be assessed and discussed jointly 
as well as presented on regular basis. 
 
2. National ‘ownership’ (of the programme) is very important for successful completion of clearance 
operations. When planning for national capacity building, the time framework, full commitment, clear 
benchmarks and sustainable funding need to be clearly defined from the start of the process. 
 
3. Unlike some programmes, which close-down because of lack of funding or poor quality and/or 
insufficient programme value, the Albanian Mine Action Programme terminated only when the job was 
completed and Albania could be declared ‘mine free’. Nevertheless, even after this point there is a need 
for residual capacity dealing with potential EOD-calls, as well as for the structure that would be able 
coordinate this capacity. 
 
4. The IMSMA database must be finalised before closing of the clearance operations as well as 
transferred to the most appropriate ministry or entity so that it can be readily available if information 
from the database is needed. This step should ideally be defined well in advance. 
 
5. All staff should be informed of closure plans from the beginning and in a transparent manner. Staff 
should also be informed of any plans beyond clearance completion, if applicable. 
 
6. During the last phases, operations must remain tightly controlled and monitored to prevent any 
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breakdown in discipline, productivity or safety practices. 
 
7. Close liaison among the local Mine Action authority, operators and donors should be maintained to 
ensure a common understanding of the clearance process and progress. Equally (if not more) important 
is the communication and liaison with local communities. The communities need to be kept informed 
throughout the clearance operations as well as during the close-down phases. The need for the post 
clearance impact survey is of immense importance also to ensure that the land cleared and handed-over 
is indeed used thus proving the local population gained confidence and trusts the clearance efforts and 
operations executed. 
 
8. Based on realistic planning, the concrete figures substantiated by results must be transparently and 
constantly presented to donors. This ensures continuous donor interest and re-affirms their belief in the 
joint vision for the mine (and cluster munitions) free Albania. 
 
9. Advocacy efforts are crucial to ensure that focus is maintained on the remaining problem during the 
last years of clearance. If focus wavers there is always a threat that donors will slowly loose interest and 
shift their priority focus to other areas or regions, at a point when the contamination reduction is 
moving into the final stages. 
 
10. Transparency of the use of donor funds through actual results achieved must be constantly fulfilled 
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ANNEX 1 – TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS 
 
1999 • Albanian Mine Action Committee (AMAC) founded  
• AMAC establishes the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) 
• Survey undertaken by AAF and consultants commissioned by CARE International 
2000 • Albania ratifies APMBC (February)  
• RONCO begins demining operations under guidance of AMAC (June) 
2001 • Stockpile destruction commences through NATO Partnership for Peace initiative (January) 
• UNDP assessment of mine action in Albania (September) 
2002 • UNDP Capacity Building project starts 
• Stockpile destruction complete (April) 
• National mine action planning workshop (June) 
• National Mine Action Plan developed for 2003-2005 
• DCA starts operations in Albania following the closure of its Kosovo programme 
2003 • Swiss Operations Advisor starts (May) 
2004 • UN provides Operations Advisor, CTA and UN volunteer for victim assistance 
• FSD leaves due to lack of funding (March) 
• HI leaves after fatal accident during training session in Kukës, leaving DCA as sole operator 
in Albania (May) 
2005 • UNDP Technical Survey Project 
• Rapid Rural Appraisal conducted by UNDP and AMAE in affected districts of Kukës 
2006 • Revision of National Mine Action Strategy (August) 
• Development of National Mine Action Plan for Completion (2007-2010) through UNDP 
Completion Initiative; completion forecast for 2010 
2007 • National Mine Action Legislation is adopted (June) 
• UNDP Evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme; Evaluation finds that AMAE 
and UNDP did not make significant progress in obtaining commitment from the 
Government of Albania to integrate AMAE (August) 
• AMAE Capacity Building completed and reduced international expertise (UNDP 
CTA/Programme Manager departs) 
• Plans to establish National Clearance Capacity abandoned 
2008 • Gërdec Ammunition depot explosion (March), AMAE and DCA involvement in rapid 
response, clearance and support to survivors; a turning point for AMAE 
• AMAE revises National Mine Action Plan for Completion (2009-2010) 
2009 • Albania completes APMBC Article 5 obligations, nine months ahead of scheduled deadline 
(November) 
• Government announces Action Plan to deal with the problem of excess ammunition, 
however no decision taken on the future of AMAE 
2010 • UNDP Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive and Transition Plan 
recommends the use of AMAE capacity to support wider demilitarisation, in particular 
involvement in monitoring and coordinating the clearance of UXO contamination resulting 
from unplanned ammunition depot explosions (September)  
• Still no decision taken by the Government on the future of AMAE 
2011 • Ministry of Defence and UNDP sign Memorandum of Understanding on 1 November 
which officially widens mandate of AMAE (renamed Albania Mines and Munitions 
Coordination Office - AMMCO) as coordination body for hotspots clearance  
• AMMCO secures funding from UNDP Country Office until April 2012  
2012 • AMMCO secures UNDP BCPR pledge for funding beyond May 2012 
• AMMCO initiates negotiations with the European Union on longer term funding 
 
 
• AMMCO remains UNDP project implementation unit; no decision taken by Government 
on integration of AMMCO in government 
ANNEX 2 – PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 
 
Name Organisation Position 
Jonuz Kola ALB-AID (formerly VMA) Director 
Arian Starova AMAC Deputy Minister of Defence 
Arben Braha AMAE Director 
Juliana Buzi AMAE Mine Action Specialist 
Veri Dogjani AMAE Victim Assistance Expert 
 Blerta Cani ARDF Director 
Anthony Connell DCA Programme Manager 
Stefano Calabreta European Commission  Former UNDP CTA 
Halil Radogoshi GICHD Systems Support Officer 
Kerry Brinkert GICHD ISU Director 
Paramdeep Mtharu GICHD ISU Implementation Support Officer 
 Edlira Sina and Dr. Tidita 
Abhurrahmani 
Institute of Development of 
Education (formerly Institute of 
Curricula) Specialist and Director 
Gregor Sancanin ITF Project Manager 
Sabina Beber Boštjančič ITF Head of Department for International Relations 
 Emin Ferati and Leze Korbi and Fadil 
Shehu Kukës Hospital 
Director and staff from the Prosthetic workshop and 
Physiotherapy centre 
Arben Kotobelli NAMSA Project Supervisor 
Eva Veble NPA (formerly DCA) Former DCA Mine Action Head 
Shefqet Bruka Regional Council, Kukës 
Former Regional Councillor and AMAE QM 
Supervisor 
Franz Baer Swiss Government AMAE/AMMCO Operations Advisor 
Melanie Reimer UNDP Former Victim Assistance Advisor 
Vladimir Malkaj UNDP UNDP Cluster Manager 
Reuben McCarthy UNICEF  Previously with UNDP BCPR 
Murph McCloy US Department of State Advisor 
 
 
ANNEX 3 - DEFINING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP IN THE MINE 
CLEARANCE CONTEXT  
 
Cartagena Summit: 
“The States Parties have come to recognise that strong national ownership is essential for ensuring that 
cooperation can flourish. Mine‐affected States Parties themselves have remarked that national ownership 
in the clearance of anti‐personnel mines and other explosive hazards implies, inter alia, the following five 
components:  
(i) high level interest and leadership in fulfilling mine clearance obligations,  
(ii) a national authority empowered and provided with the human, financial and material capacity to carry 
out its responsibilities,  
(iii) a clear understanding of the size, location and quality of the Article 5 implementation challenge or a 
commitment to promptly acquire such an understanding,  
(iv) a realistic but not unambitious plan to complete implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible and,  
(v) a regular significant national financial commitment to the State’s own humanitarian demining 
programme.  
It has been noted that, while the existence of these components will not guarantee that resources will flow 
in response to needs, demonstrating national ownership makes it significantly more likely that 




Action 16 of the Cartagena Action Plan recommends that States Parties: 
Take full national ownership of their Article 5 obligations by developing, implementing and regularly 
reviewing national mine action strategies and associated policies, plans, budget policies and legal 
frameworks, and inform the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine 
Action Technologies on their implementation. 
 
At the June 2010 meetings of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Standing Committees, it was 
proposed that “national ownership in relation to victim assistance could comprise the following six 
elements: 
a) a high level commitment to addressing the rights and needs of mine victims and other persons with 
disabilities 
b) a national coordination mechanism empowered and provided with the human, financial and material 
capacity to carry out its responsibilities 
c) a comprehensive plan and legislation to address the rights and needs of persons with disabilities 
including mine victims 
d) a regular, significant commitment to implement the policy, plan and legislation and to provide services 
e) capacity to implement the policy, plan and legislation or steps taken to acquire the resources necessary 
to build this capacity 
f) a national focal entity for disability‐related issues
68
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 Final Report of the 30 November – 4 December 2009 Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
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ANNEX 4 – SUMMARY OF TRANSITION-RELATED 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM 2007 UNDP EVALUATION 
 
The following is brief summary of the key findings, recommendations and lessons learned identified in 
UNDP’s 2007 evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme, which relate specifically to the issues of 
national ownership, transition, capacity development and programme closure. 
 
• Develop a comprehensive detailed plan for the phase-out of the programme. 
 
• Capacity development is more than training staff and establishing standards for the technical 
implementation of a program. Technical capacity and institutional capacity are very different and 
require different plans, approaches and skills. Management, including financial and institutional 
capacity development is equally important and more critical for the long term sustainability of the 
organisation or institution. It is good management that gains donor confidence more than technical 
capacity.  
 
• National capacity development takes time, patience, commitment and sustainable funding. 
 
• It is not essential to establish a national mine action centre for every programme. The size of the 
landmine problem, including its overall impact on the country and not just the region or regions 
where the landmines are located, should be factors in determining the structure and management of 
the programme. For example, if it takes three years for a national mine action centre to achieve a 
level where it is capable to manage the problem, and the remaining landmine problem requires just 
another three years, is it worth the time, effort and risk to establish the mine action centre as an 
autonomous agency to finish the job? At what point does striving towards a point when international 
advisors can be decreased or phased out become a distraction to finishing the job? At what point 
should the national government be held to ensuring the security of its people and required to take 
ownership of the mine action programme? 
 
• Real government ownership of mine action and the affects of landmines will be demonstrated 
through long term sustainable support for landmine survivors through government structures, 
policies and new laws affecting people with disabilities. 
 
• Long term capacity development and government ownership should be planned for during the 
emergency phase of a program. This may require a two-prong approach with different staff: one to 
implement the emergency phase and the other to plan for the long term stabilisation of the program 
with government ownership being the primary focus. 
 
• Closing down a programme is the most difficult task of all. It is not easy and it is usually painful as 
staff morale plummets in such situations. Unlike some programs that close because donors stopped 
funding them or the program was of poor quality and value, the Albanian Mine Action Program can 
stand tall and leave knowing they did the job and made Albania mine free, and reduced new 
accidents and victims to zero and the programme closed because it was successful. Still, like a start 
up, closing a program needs a strategy and a plan.  
 
• The database must be finalised before closing and it must be transferred to the most appropriate 


































ANNEX 7 – AMAE TO AMMCO TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN (EXTRACT) 
 
Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance & Ammunition 
Destruction Programme  
 
The Kosovo armed conflict of 1999 contributed to the land contamination of about 120 sq km along the 
Albanian northeast border with mines and cluster munitions.  
 
The Government and the donor community have swiftly responded to this situation by backing the 
establishment and consolidation of adequate responsible institutional structure, Albanian Mine Action 
Executive- AMAE, capable of coordinating and monitoring a comprehensive humanitarian mine action 
programme in line with UN international standards.  
 
The Government of Albania recognizes the crucial role that the United Nations Development Programme, 
with the support of the international community, has played to the successful implementation of the 
Albanian Mine Action Programme, leading to remarkable achievements in mine clearance, victim 
assistance and mine risk education. It is mainly due to this support that Albania could proudly declare the 
country free of landmines and cluster munitions in November 2009, fulfilling in anticipation an important 
international commitment on demilitarization. In particular, we highly appreciate UNDP’s support in the 
development of sustainable capacities of the Albanian Mine Action Executive - AMAE through direct 
financial and technical assistance. UNDP Albania has played a lead role in developing and sustaining the 
above structure as well as in securing resources and partnerships and guiding the humanitarian demining 
programme progress until its successful end.  
 
AMAE’s role has been critical for such an achievement, with a unique contribution to coordination and 
monitoring, adoption of quality assurance and quality management in the implementation of 
internationally recognized mine action standards as well as an exemplary partnership and resource 
mobilization strategy.  
These capacities along with the available equipment and infrastructure established during the course of 
the mine action programme are assets that can contribute further to demilitarization efforts including the 
hotspots clearance contaminated by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Abounded Unexploded 
Ordnance (AXO).  
 
During its existence, AMAE has also established a broad international network and built the confidence 
through transparent reporting and effective coordination, established sound accreditation procedures 
and operated as a reliable national accreditation body for Mine Action, and also set up, with the support 
of GICHD, a unique information management system which has been already adapted to demilitarisation 
and hotspot clearance programmes.  
 
In recognizing AMAE’s built capacities and experience to date, we believe that such capacities are very 
relevant and valuable to our current demilitarization priorities. As we are already aware, one of Albania’s 
current challenges is the disposal of a large stockpile of aging weapons and ammunition in possession of 
the Albanian Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence has outlined a Plan of Action for Elimination of 
Excess Ammunition in the AAF with the aim to utilize national capacities to dispose of all surplus 
ammunition by 2013. Furthermore, the hot‐spots contaminated with abandoned unexploded ammunition 





To this purpose, in order to make the best use of AMAE’s technical expertise, equipment and 
infrastructure established with valuable donors’ funding and UNDP’s support, I would like to express our 
willing to engage this professional structure to contribute through a similar institutional arrangement and 
role, inclusive of its know-how in mine victim assistance and risk education/community liaison activities, 
in the area of hotspots clearance and ammunition disposal, so as to help ensure that these components 
are brought up and carried out in accordance with the International Humanitarian Standards.  
Based on this experience, the strategic support and contribution to the ammunition stockpile destruction 
would contain the following components/tasks:  
1. Review existing safety and quality standards for ammunition disposal and hotspots clearance and 
upgrade them to international standards  
2. Develop an accreditation standard package for eventual private contractors seeking to operate OBOD 
ranges and hotspot areas;  
3. Conduct a detailed technical assessment of the hotspots contaminated areas in order to prepare the 
relevant clearance plans;  
4. Adopt mechanisms for ensuring quality assurance and quality control of OBOD activities and hotspots 
clearance in assigned locations;  
5. Develop adequate public awareness and risk education mechanisms for local communities;  
6. Expand existing mine action victim assistance programme to include and benefit nationwide ERW 
survivors for possible assistance schemes;  
7. Establish a national database for mines/ abandoned ammunition victims survivors throughout 
Albania;  
8. Contribute in resource mobilization for ammunition stockpile destruction and hotspots clearance 
through furthering partnerships as well as by introducing best practice experiences through UN’s 
global network;  
9. Support the Albania Government to fulfil its annual transparency reporting obligations under the 
various related Conventions;  
10. Support the Albania Government to fulfil its Presidency role at the Tenth Meetings of States Parties 
to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention;  
 
Milestones & Immediate next Steps  
The following milestones indicate the next steps to be undertaken by UNDP CO for the involvement of 
AMAE in the national demilitarization plan along with extending its mandate in mine action during this 
extension period:  
 
Milestone 1: AMAE Integration with Demilitarisation Programme  
 UN Country Team meeting to discuss programme and collaboration.  
 Donor meeting including the EC delegation to gauge interest and raise support for AMAE 
engagement in Demilitarisation Programme.  
 Inclusion of United Nations as official partner in ‘Demilitarization Plan’ of the government.  
 Inclusion of AMAE in Demilitarization Committee of the MOD.  
 Expand mandate of AMAC (or merge with National SALW Commission) in support of Demilitarization 
as inter-ministerial liaison body and support to Demilitarization Committee.  
 Extend Government MOU with UNDP in mine action and revise to include Demilitarization.  
 Draft PRODOC for signature with government and UNDP.  
 Inclusion of Demilitarization in CPAP, UNDAF, and One UN Programme to promote human security 
and development.  
 
Milestone 2: Development of Ammunition Demolition capacity in AMAE.  
 AMAE training in EOD, ammunition transportation and demolition, IMSMA V (MySQL).  
 Follow up offers of in-kind assistance by Swiss government and others.  
 Recruitment of Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Ammunition Specialist.  
 New staff TOR to include EOD/ammunition , especially for QA officers  
 Redeploy AMAE Kukës (IMSMA & equipments) to Tirana during the extension period.  
 
 
 Activation of IMSMA V and development of Ammunition Module.  
 Develop work plan and strategic goals for OBOD, hot-spots, standards development and quality 
management.  
 Revise Community Liaison strategy, standards and procedures.  
 Revise Risk Education messages, strategy, standards and procedures.  
 Develop national OBOD and EOD accreditation and licensing standards, in consultation with MoD, 
NAMSA, and others.  
 Develop national ammunition transportation and demolition standards, in consultation with MoD, 
NAMSA, and others.  
 Develop QA/QC operating procedures, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.  
 
 
ANNEX 8 - DCA´S LESSONS LEARNED FROM ITS PILOT RE-
TRAINING AND RE-INTEGRATION PROJECT 
 
The following are some of the key lessons learned by DCA from its pilot re-training and re-




• There is a need to have an international specialist supervise a re‐integration project, who 
must work full time on the project to ensure hands‐on management in a continuous manner 
and smooth cooperation between all project stakeholders – both internal and external 
 
• Planning with the target group needs to start 12 months prior to the close down of a 
program to ensure smooth transition between full‐time employment and a sustainable re‐
integration effort 
 
• Liaison with the key stakeholders should commence 9‐12 months prior to the close down to 
ensure their needs are fully met 
 
• It should be explored to combine generic skills training for the whole target group (e.g. 
household financial management, basic accounting) with an individualised, demand driven 
re‐training program 
 
• In order to ensure the timely availability of re‐training courses to target group members, the 
initial re‐training questionnaire should only include courses which are already on offer by a 
qualified re‐training provider 
 
• A demand drive re‐training process should always be coupled with realistic employment 
prospects, supporting hands‐on skills development and supplementary income generation 
potential within a relatively short timeframe 
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ANNEX 10 – SAMPLE HOTSPOT SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
REPORT 
 
 SOCIO- ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF HOTSPOTS  
Hotspot: Ura e Gjadrit/Mali i Rrezume (Shkoder)  
Date of Assessment: 27 October 2011  
_____________________________________________________________
__  
General Data Region  Shkoder  
District  Vau i Dejes  
Commune  Vig-Mnele  
Village  Mali i Rrezume  
Point of Contact  Mr. Mark Ngoci ; + 355 68 34 53 544 (head of 
Quarter)  
Mr. Sander Nikolli; 355 6  
Mr. Pjeter Lleshi ; +355 6  
Socio‐economic impact  Low Medium High  
Number of beneficiaries  Direct: 380 inhabitants  
Indirect : 2,150 
Number of casualties (Injured, Dead)  6 injured and two dead  
 
 1. Situation  
Mali i Rrezume village is part of the Vig - Mnele Commune in the region of Shkoder. The 
distance from Vau i Dejes is around 5 kilometer and the road is new and in good condition. The 
village has around 380 inhabitants. There is no health post and medical personnel in the village.  
The army depots have been located At Mali i Rrezume village where several types of 
ammunition had been stored. During the uprising in Albania in 1997, civilians looted the 
ammunition storage site of the village Mali i Rrezume. There were a number of explosions in 
1997 at this army depot, which resulted in the complete destruction of the site and created a 
UXO contamination of the surrounding area. The AAF made a surface clearance of the area. 
Today the site contains still unexploded ordnance and remnants of ammunition, posing a real 
threat to local inhabitants. There is also a demolition pit within the area that needs to be 
cleared from any remnants of ammunition.  
The hotspot area lies close to Gjadri riverbed. The area can be reached by driving through the 
town of Vau Dejes (Puka road) and then following direction Hajmeli and crossing the bridge of 
the river Gjadri. In the back of these basements lies a steep hill and another dirty road leads to a 
well visible stone quarry. This quarry is located well within the hazardous area. On the opposite 
site of these three basements, there is another basement, backed by a small hill.  
In April 1997, there was an explosion in the army depots in Mali i Rrezume village. There have 
been accidents in the village in 1997; six injured people and two fatalities. Based on the filed 
 
 
visits and contacts with local inhabitants and officials, not all the injured people are reported 
and registered in AMMCO database.  
The Albanian Armed Forces conducted clearance during 1998-1999 within the areas of the 
military compound and the surrounding areas.  
 
The locals confirmed that while digging in their land, they occasionally find items spread from 
the explosion. In addition, explosions are heard in case of fire in the surrounding areas of the 
army depots. Local inhabitants are currently searching for scrap metal in the army depots.  
It is important to mention that there are no warnings signs or any billboard to just keep local 
inhabitants aware of the danger present in the zone.  
The main incomes and employment opportunities in the village are from cultivating the land 
and animal husbandry. Emigration is common too. The arable field used by the inhabitants is 
considerable and the local inhabitants are trying to make use of every section of land in their 
possession. They are cultivating: maize, corn, etc and grazing the animals. The majority of the 
arable fields are accessed by irrigation water.  
2. Further action and steps recommended  
2.1 Risk Education/Community Liaison:  
• Due to the very serious threat at this hotspot, a billboard with Risk Education messages 
should be installed immediately. Visible and accurate marking should be done  
 
• Media materials should be produced and distributed to local people.  
 
• Community meetings/liaison activities, collection of information from locals for the 
presence of ammunition in the area.  
 
2.2 Victim Assistance:  
• An in depth and detailed assessment should be made with survivors and their families, 
to identify and address their needs.  
 
• Since the clearance company (DCA) will conduct clearance operations in the hotspot, 
the emergency and surgical capacities at Regional Hospital (either Lezha or Shkodra) 
need to be examined.  
 




ANNEX 11 – AMAE TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
 
Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance & Ammunition Destruction 
Programme  
 
The Kosovo armed conflict of 1999 contributed to the land contamination of about 120 sq km along the 
Albanian northeast border with mines and cluster munitions. The Government and the donor community 
have swiftly responded to this situation by backing the establishment and consolidation of adequate 
responsible institutional structure, Albanian Mine Action Executive- AMAE, capable of coordinating and 
monitoring a comprehensive humanitarian mine action programme in line with UN international 
standards.  
 
The Government of Albania recognizes the crucial role that the United Nations Development Programme, 
with the support of the international community, has played to the successful implementation of the 
Albanian Mine Action Programme, leading to remarkable achievements in mine clearance, victim 
assistance and mine risk education. It is mainly due to this support that Albania could proudly declare the 
country free of landmines and cluster munitions in November 2009, fulfilling in anticipation an important 
international commitment on demilitarization. In particular, we highly appreciate UNDP’s support in the 
development of sustainable capacities of the Albanian Mine Action Executive - AMAE through direct 
financial and technical assistance. UNDP Albania has played a lead role in developing and sustaining the 
above structure as well as in securing resources and partnerships and guiding the humanitarian demining 
programme progress until its successful end.  
 
AMAE’s role has been critical for such an achievement, with a unique contribution to coordination and 
monitoring, adoption of quality assurance and quality management in the implementation of 
internationally recognized mine action standards as well as an exemplary partnership and resource 
mobilization strategy.  
These capacities along with the available equipment and infrastructure established during the course of 
the mine action programme are assets that can contribute further to demilitarization efforts including the 
hotspots clearance contaminated by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Abounded Unexploded 
Ordnance (AXO).  
 
During its existence, AMAE has also established a broad international network and built the confidence 
through transparent reporting and effective coordination, established sound accreditation procedures 
and operated as a reliable national accreditation body for Mine Action, and also set up, with the support 
of GICHD, a unique information management system which has been already adapted to demilitarisation 
and hotspot clearance programmes.  
 
In recognizing AMAE’s built capacities and experience to date, we believe that such capacities are very 
relevant and valuable to our current demilitarization priorities. As we are already aware, one of Albania’s 
current challenges is the disposal of a large stockpile of aging weapons and ammunition in possession of 
the Albanian Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence has outlined a Plan of Action for Elimination of 
Excess Ammunition in the AAF with the aim to utilize national capacities to dispose of all surplus 
ammunition by 2013. Furthermore, the hot‐spots contaminated with abandoned unexploded ammunition 
are identified as an additional threat, until these are cleared in compliance with relevant international 
standards.  
 
To this purpose, in order to make the best use of AMAE’s technical expertise, equipment and 
infrastructure established with valuable donors’ funding and UNDP’s support, I would like to express our 
 
 
willing to engage this professional structure to contribute through a similar institutional arrangement and 
role, inclusive of its know-how in mine victim assistance and risk education/community liaison activities, 
in the area of hotspots clearance and ammunition disposal, so as to help ensure that these components 
are brought up and carried out in accordance with the International Humanitarian Standards.  
Based on this experience, the strategic support and contribution to the ammunition stockpile destruction 
would contain the following components/tasks:  
 
1. Review existing safety and quality standards for ammunition disposal and hotspots clearance and 
upgrade them to international standards  
2. Develop an accreditation standard package for eventual private contractors seeking to operate OBOD 
ranges and hotspot areas;  
3. Conduct a detailed technical assessment of the hotspots contaminated areas in order to prepare the 
relevant clearance plans;  
4. Adopt mechanisms for ensuring quality assurance and quality control of OBOD activities and hotspots 
clearance in assigned locations;  
5. Develop adequate public awareness and risk education mechanisms for local communities;  
6. Expand existing mine action victim assistance programme to include and benefit nationwide ERW 
survivors for possible assistance schemes;  
7. Establish a national database for mines/ abandoned ammunition victims survivors throughout 
Albania;  
8. Contribute in resource mobilization for ammunition stockpile destruction and hotspots clearance 
through furthering partnerships as well as by introducing best practice experiences through UN’s 
global network;  
9. Support the Albania Government to fulfill its annual transparency reporting obligations under the 
various related Conventions;  
10. Support the Albania Government to fulfill its Presidency role at the Tenth Meetings of States Parties 
to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention;  
 
Milestones & Immediate next Steps  
The following milestones indicate the next steps to be undertaken by UNDP CO for the involvement of 
AMAE in the national demilitarization plan along with extending its mandate in mine action during this 
extenions period:  
 
Milestone 1: AMAE Integartion with Demilitarisation Programme  
• UN Country Team meeting to discuss programme and collaboration.  
• Donor meeting including the EC delegation to guage interest and raise support for AMAE 
engagement in Demilitarisation Programme.  
• Inclusion of United Nations as official partner in ‘Demilitarization Plan’ of the government.  
• Inclusion of AMAE in Demilitarization Committee of the MOD.  
• Expand mandate of AMAC (or merge with National SALW Commission) in support of 
Demilitarization as interministerial liaison body and support to Demilitarization Committee.  
• Extend Government MOU with UNDP in mine action and revise to include Demilitarization.  
• Draft PRODOC for signature with government and UNDP.  
• Inclusion of Demilitarization in CPAP, UNDAF, and One UN Programme to promote human 
security and development.  
 
Milestone 2: Development of Ammunition Demolition capacity in AMAE.  
• AMAE training in EOD, ammunition transportation and demolition, IMSMA V (MySQL).  
• Follow up offers of in-kind assistance by Swiss government and others.  
• Recruitment of Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Ammunition Specialist.  
• New staff TOR to include EOD/ammunition , especially for QA officers  
• Redeploy AMAE Kukes (IMSMA & equipments) to Tirana during the extention period.  
 
 
• Activation of IMSMA V and development of Ammunition Module.  
• Develop work plan and strategic goals for OBOD, hot-spots, standards development and quality 
management.  
• Revise Community Liaison strategy, standards and procedures.  
• Revise Risk Education messages, strategy, standards and procedures.  
• Develop national OBOD and EOD accreditation and licensing standards, in consultation with MoD, 
NAMSA, and others.  
• Develop national ammunition transportation and demolition standards, in consultation with MoD, 
NAMSA, and others.  
• Develop QA/QC operating procedures, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.  
 
In view of the above, an extension until the end of February 2011 would be beneficial to a proper 
conclusion and/or transition of this programme to most effectively benefit current country priorities.  
 
In mine time we are finalizing the project proposal in order to obtain the bridge funds from UNDP BCPR 
(100.000 USD) were UNDP CO contribution is foreseen as the cost share to this project.  
In consideration of the above reasons, we would appreciate receiving your concurrence and approval of 
such a request for extension.  
 
Key Staff Terms of Reference  
 
1. National Director and Project Manager  
The AMAE Director is responsible to the AMAC Chairman for the execution of the following duties:  
• Advise AMAC on International policy and assist in the formulation of a National Action Plan;  
• Assist with and compile clearance and OBOD priorities and present them to AMAC for confirmation;  
• Provide the secretariat for AMAC;  
• Responsible for the formulation and execution of strategic and operational plans for AMAE.  
• Co-ordinate and control all ERW/AXO clearance and OBOD Programme in Albania through the AMAE;  
• Manage the AMAE in respect of all matters including personnel, information, planning, operations, 
standards, training, logistics and finances;  
• Maintain the ERW/AXO information database on a daily basis;  
• Compile monthly reports on ERW/AXO Action and reports on all visits regarding ERW/AXO Action 
activities for distribution to AMAC, UNDP and other interested parties;  
• Provide accurate information to the press and media in consultation with AMAC;  
• Provide advice, planning and relevant training to the AMAE personnel regarding ERW/AXO Action, 
RE, Victim Assistance, quality management and ERW/AXO surveys;  
• Ensure through AMAE the quality management of all ERW/AXO Action in Albania;  
• Liaison with the international community, local communities and all authorities regarding ERW/AXO 
Action;  
 
The AMAE Manager will make no policy decision without consulting with UNDP CO and AMAC;  
 
2. Programme Specialist  
The Programme Specialist is responsible to the AMAE Director for the execution of the following duties:  
• Provide support and advice in the establishment of reliable mechanisms for ensuring that ERW/AXO 
related information are processed through appropriate channels and eventually received by the 
AMAE IMSMA database.  
• Drafting several plans, and related documents as required to support AMAE activities;  
• Ensure all the necessary data for AMAE Management during the preparation of briefing documents 
for the resource mobilization;  




• Prepare progress reports, briefings and presentations for various donors as required;  
• Prepare the annual plans and reports for the Programme;  
• Collect data and draft the report for the Albanian Government as required under Article 7 of the AP 
Mine Ban, Cluster Munitions and CCW Conventions;  
 
• Support the AMAE Director in preparing the periodic reviews of the National Mine Action 
Portfolio(Victim Assistance/Rick Education and post clearance activities) and Ammunition 
destruction, Hotspot Clearance programmes;  
• Support in preparing various project proposals for submission by AMAE to various international 
donors;  
• Prepare briefing materials on the Programme as required by Government for 
participation/contribution to eventual international meetings/events.  
 
3. Victim Assistance & Risk Education Coordinator  
The Victim Assistance & Risk Education Coordinator is responsible to the AMAE Director for the execution 
of the following duties:  
• The VA and RE Coordinator is an active member of the AMAE and coordinates and monitors all RE 
and VA activities conducted under this programme and implementing partners in Albania;  
• Liaise and coordinate with other agencies, local authorities, and organizations for RE and VA activities 
in order to encourage synergies and avoid any overlap of project ideas;  
• Provide regular updates to the RE and VA strategies for Albania;  
• Contribute to the preparation of the National Standards and SOPs for the RE and VA components;  
• Coordinate all RE and VA activities in Albania;  
• Maintain a database of all Risk Education and Victim Assistance activities conducted in Albania by all 
agencies;  
• Based on IMAS, provide appropriate guidance and standards for Risk Education and VA in Albania to 
implementing partners and coordinate their activities (ICRC, UNICEF, ITF, UNDP, Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Education, MoLSAEO, National Trauma Center (and NPOC), Regional Hospitals, HI, ALB-
AID and Albanian Red Cross );  
• Participate in the monthly Coordination meetings and present a monthly summary of RE and VA 
activities;  
• Ensure RE and VA organizations provide regular reports on their activities to the AMAE;  
• Do advocacy and resource mobilization for RE and VA projects;  
• Collect data and draft the report for the Albanian Government as required under respective articles 
of the AP Mine Ban, Cluster Munitions and CCW Conventions, in relation to the Victim Assistance.  
 
4. IMSMA Specialist  
The IMSMA Specialist is responsible to the Operations Officer for the execution of the following duties:  
• Assist the establishment of the IMSMA capability and formulate a work plan for data gathering, 
entering, collation and dissemination of ERW/AXO & EOD information;  
• Liaise with other agencies and NGOs regarding ERW/AXO clearance & EOD information and regularly 
update partner organizations in IMSMA and GIS matters;  
• Prepare data, statistics and graphics to support reporting and recording requirements of AMAE, the 
Albanian Government, donors, and other clients with mine action related information;  
• Assist in preparing task dossiers for all survey and clearance & EOD tasks in Albania;  
• Secure and control the software in the AMAE Office;  
• Administrate the IMSMA database/GIS component for the AMAE Office, including data entry, 
mapping, data quality and database back-up;  
• Receive all system related reports and enter them into the IMSMA system along with preparing 
appropriate hard copy files;  
 
 
• Generate reports, data sets, etc required to produce task dossiers for ERW/AXO clearance agencies 
as directed by operations;  
 
5. Admin/Finance Assistant  
Under the direct supervision AMAE Executive Director, the Admin/Finance Assistant will administer and 
execute processes and transactions ensuring high quality and accuracy of work. She will work in close 
collaboration with the UNDP CO to exchange information and ensure consistent service delivery. She will 
be responsible for project operational support in the area of Finance, Human Resources & Administration.  
 
- Human Resources  
• monitor and keep record the attendance of project staff and annual leave, prepare the relevant 
monthly and annually attendance reports;  
• provide human resources services for benefits administration and social insurance, including 
preparation of the Requests for Contract for project staff and follow up for PO approval;  
• TA preparation for project staff, keep record in Atlas and follow up for PO approval;  
• Arrange appointments and assist in making travel arrangements;  
• Assist in the recruitment procedures processes, checking the conformity with the AMAE/UNDP rules 
and procedures;  
 
- Finance  
• Prepare Request for Payments and ensure the supporting documents are available and in accordance 
with AMAE/UNDP rules;  
• Follow all financial and administration requirements for the recording and registering of all financial 
transactions as required by AMAE/UNDP regulations;  
• Prepare the draft of budget revision for the approval from AMAE Director and assist in the budgetary 
control;  
• Participate in drafting the new project work plan and reports;  
• Assist in preparing quarterly and annual work plans and budgets;  
• Prepare progress financial reports to be submitted to UNDP and donors;  
 
- Administrative and Logistics  
• Prepare and assist in the preparation of relevant procurement procedures for goods and consultancy 
services, prepare bidding papers in accordance with UNDP requirements, including RFP, RFQ, 
Vacancy Announcement, Contract, arrange project procurement actions within the thresholds, 
monitor and process the data in Atlas for procurement (enter requisitions and follow up the 
payments);  
• Maintain a stock control and supply system for all office consumable items;  
• Ensure and make arrangements for the regular service and maintenance of all AMAE/UNDP vehicles. 
Certify work done, carrie out quality check and control all relevant documentation including logbook 
and vehicle history files for all AMAE vehicles;  
• Ensure all logistical aspects of the AMAE Office are satisfied including the proper functioning of office 
utilities (e.g. electricity, water supply, etc.) and liaise with the landlord on all issues;  
• Control and secure all equipment of the AMAE Office are operational;  
• Maintain AMAE/UNDP Inventory records and report regularly to the AMAE Director & UNDP CO;  
• Maintain administration systems including a register and filing system for all incoming and outgoing 
correspondence at the AMAE Office;  
• Ensure fuel replenishment requisitions, vouchers and consumption;  
 
6. AMAE Professional Driver  
The Driver is responsible to the AMAE Administrative Officer for the execution of the duties contained in 
this TOR.  
• He will take direction from AMAE Director as required.  
 
 
• Collects and delivers mail, pouches and other communications from and to government agencies, UN 
agencies and other institutions.  
• Drives the office vehicle for the transport of authorized personnel and delivery and collection of mail, 
document and other items.  
• Responsible for day to day and preventative maintenance of all AMAE vehicles and generators, 
checks oil, water, battery, brakes tires and perform minor repairs and arranges other repairs and 
ensures that the vehicle is kept clean.  
• Advises on servicing schedule of all AMAE vehicles and generators and report any major faults.  
• Logs all official trips, daily mileage, fuel consumption, oil changes, greasing, etc.  
• Ensures that the steps required by the rules and regulations are taken in case of involvement in an 
accident.  
• Any other tasks as requested by the Director AMAE or the Chief Technical Advisor.  




ANNEX 12 – MAP OF UXO HOTSPOT CLEARANCE 
 
 
